

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

BETWEEN

No. 5928 of 2001

THE QUEEN

(Ex Parte THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL for the STATE OF VICTORIA)

Applicant

- and -

RAYMOND TERRENCE HOSER

First Respondent

- and -

KOTABI PTY LTD (ACN 007 395 048)

Second Respondent

APPLICANT'S AND RESPONDENTS' LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322 *Anissa*

Pty Ltd v Parsons [1999] VSC 430 (8 November 1999)

Attorney-General New South Wales v Munday [1972] 2 NSWLR 887

Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Limited [1974] AC 273

Bell v Stewart (1 920) 28 CLR 419

Colina v Torney (Family Court, Ellis J, 2 March 2000)

Davis v Baillie [1946] VLR 486

Exparte BreadManufacturers Ltd, . re Truth and Sportsman Ltd (1937) 37 SR

(NSW)

242

Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238

Gilbert Ahnee v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 AC 294; [1999] 2
WLR

1305

Giyt'llan v County Court of Victoria and anor [2001] VSC 360 (13

September 2001)

Hammersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell [1998] 19 WAR 316

John Fairfax and Sons v McRae (1 954) 93 CLR 3 51

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) [2000] NSWCA 198

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Doe (1995) 37 NSWLR 81

Keeley v Brooking (1 979) 143 CLR 162

Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1 997) 189 CLR 520

Levy v The State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579

Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682

Magistrates' Court at Heidelberg v Robinson [2000] VSCA 198

Maslen v The Official Receiver (1 947) 74 CLR 602

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1 992) 177 CLR 1

Pennekamp v State of Florida (1946) 328 US 331

R v Brett [1 950] VLR 226

R v Crockett [2001] VSCA 95

R v Dunbabin (1935) 53 CLR 434

R v Fletcher, ex parte Kische (1935) 52 CLR 248

R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36

R v Kopyto (1 987) 47 DLR (4th) 213; (1987) 62 OR (2d) 449

R v Nicholls (1 911) 12 CLR 280

Rann v Olsen [2000] SASC 83

Re Borowski (1971) 19 DLR (No.3d) 537

Re Colina & Anor, ex parte Torney [1999] 200 CLR 386

Re Perkins (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 3 April 1998)

Re: Special Reference from Bahaman Islands [1 8931 AC 138

Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Willesee [1984] 2 NSWLR 378

Saltalamacchia v Parsons [2000] VSCA 83 (15 May 2000)

Solicitor General v Radio Avon Ltd [1978] 225

Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211

Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1 994) 182 CLR 104

Witham v Holloway (1 995) 183 CLR 525

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. HOSER

RESPONDENTS' LIST OF AUTHORITIES

1. *R v. Nicholls* (1911) 12 CLR 280.
2. *R v. Fletcher, . ex parte Kisch* (1935) 52 CLR 248.
3. *R v. Dunbabin; ex parte Williams* (1935) 53 CLR 434.
4. *Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago* [1936] AC 322.
5. *Pennekamp v. State of Florida* (1946) 328 US 33 1.
6. *Maslen v. Official Receiver* (1947) 74 CLR 603.
7. *R v. Brett* [1950] VLR 228.
8. *John Fai & Sons v. McRae* (1955) 93 CLR 351.
9. *Attorney-General (NSW) v. Munday* [1972] 2 NSWLR 887.
10. *Gallagher v. Durack* (1983) 152 CLR 238.
11. *Registrar of Court of Appeal v. Willesee* [1984] 2 NSWLR 378.
12. *Lewis v. Ogden* (1984) 153 CLR 682.
13. *R. v. Kopyto* (1987) 24 OAC 81; 39 CCC (3d) 1.
14. *Nationwide News Pty Ltd v. Wills* (1992) 177 CLR 1.
15. *Witham v. Holloway* (1995) 183 CLR 525.
16. *Lange* (1995) 182 CLR 104.
17. *Anissa Pty Ltd v. Parsons* [1999] VSC 430 (8 November 1999).
18. *Re Colina; ex parte Torney* (1992) 200 CLR 386.
19. *Ahnee v. Director of Public Prosecutions* [1991] 2 AC 294.
20. *Saltalamacchia v. Parsons* [2001] VSCA 83 (15 May 2000).
21. *Magistrates' Court at Heidelberg v. Robinson* [2001] VSCA 198.
22. *Colina v. Torney* (Family Court, Ellis J, 2 March 2000).

23. *R v. Crockett* [20011 VSCA 95.

24. *Giffillan v. County Court of Victoria* [20011 VSC 360 (13 September 2001).

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OUTLINE OF RESPONDENTS' SUBMISSIONS

Sunnuary

- 1 . The publication of the books did not constitute the offence of scandalising the Court.
2. Alternatively, if the conduct of the respondents would otherwise contravene the law of contempt, then that law is invalid *pro tanto* since it -
 - (a) iinpairs freedom of conunication on matters of government and politics;
 - (b) is not "reasonably appropriate and adapted" to achieving the legitimate object of protecting the administration of justice; and
 - (c) accordingly, infringes the implied constitutional freedom of communication, and is therefore invalid.

The offence of "scandalising the Court"

3 The offence of scandalising the Court is, or should be, narrowly defined.'

4. The very notion of "scandalising" is archaic. According to The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary,¹ "scandalise" means ~

"offend moral feelings, sense of propriety, or ideas of etiquette ".

5 . In the United Kingdom, as long ago as 1899, the offence was said to be obsolete.' In 1999, the House of Lords, while recognising the existence of the offence, noted that such proceedings were rare and none had been successfully brought for more than 60 years.'

6. The law of contempt is, of course, not concerned with hurt feelings, but with the protection of the administration of justice.'

7. The offence is, or should be, confined to those cases where the publication has a clear tendency to damage the administration of justice and where, as a result, protection is required.

8. The test developed in the United States, albeit in a different constitutional

setting, is of assistance. A publication should not be punishable unless it creates-

"a clear and present danger [of damage to the administration of justice] of high imminence".'

. Oxford University Press, 1987 p 994.
. *McLeod v St Aubyn* [1899] AC 549 at 561; see also Brett at 228.
. *Ahnee* (supra) at 305H.
5 *Pennekamp v State* of Florida (1946) 328 US 331 at
Ahnee (supra) at 306B.
6 *Pennekamp* (supra).

9. The entire rationale for the availability, and utilisation, of the summary procedure is that the publication is such as to create an urgent need to protect the administration of justice.'
10. The test of "impairing" or "undermining" public confidence in the administration of justice is unacceptably imprecise, subjective and uncertain.

There is no damage

11. Robust criticism of particular courts, judges and magistrates is a commonplace.'
12. Some of the most trenchant criticism comes from within the justice system itself.'
13. There is nothing to suggest that criticism of this kind damages the administration of justice, in the sense of impairing the ability of judges and magistrates to carry out their duties in accordance with law. Nor is there any basis for asserting that public confidence is affected.
14. The same applies to criticisms contained in the relevant books. The books were published in August 1999, more than two years ago."

15. The delay in the bringing of these proceedings bears eloquent testimony to the lack of any relevant effect on the administration of justice.

⁷ *Attorney-General New South Wales v Munday* [1972] 2 NSWLR 887 at 912A-B; *Maslen v. The Official receiver* (1947) 74 CLR 602.

Munday (supra) at 910.

· See eg. *Crockett; Giffillan v County Court of Victoria and anor* [2001] VSC 360 at *Magistrates' Court at Heidelberg v Robinson* [2000] VSCA 198 at para 12 per Brooking SA; *Suttin(?)* at paras 6 & 7 per Tadgell JA.

The tendency **of** the publication

16. Whether or not a publication is calculated to cause damage of the requisite kind to the administration of justice must be judged by reference to all of the circumstances, in particular -

(a) the form, content, presentation and circulation of the work;

(b) the status of the author in relation to the subject-matter;

(c) the purpose of the publication.

17. In the present case, the following circumstances are relevant:

(a) the work is self-published;

(b) its circulation is very limited;

(c) the author is writing not as an expert on law or criminal justice but as someone who has been subjected to its processes;

(d) the author has a long-standing, demonstrated commitment to investigating and exposing what he perceives to be impropriety in the administration of justice;

(c) his expressed intent is to secure improvements in the administration of justice, by drawing attention to its perceived deficiencies."

Criticisms of the courts is necessary in a democracy

18. It has long been recognised that -

*"it is in the public interest, and particularly in the
interest
of the administration of justice, that members of the public*

Hoser **affidavit** para 5.
Victoria Police Corruption - 2 p. 18.

should have the right publicly to criticise the public acts of judges and courts"."

19. Moreover -

'criticism does not become contempt because it is 'wrong-headed' or based on the mistaken view of the facts or of the law. Nor, in my opinion need it be respectfully courteous or cool the unemotional. There is no more reason why the acts of courts should not be trenchantly criticised than the acts of other public institutions, including parliaments. "'

20. The law of contempt of court will only be attracted where it is shown, beyond reasonable doubt, that the criticism was made otherwise than in good faith.

21. The prosecution must fail on this ground. No such proof has been established. On the contrary, no other conclusion is open but that the respondents were acting in good faith in making the criticisms complained of.

The implied freedom of communication

22. Alternatively, if the respondents would be liable to conviction at common law for the offence of scandalising the Court, then the law of contempt is in its application to the respondents invalid.

23. Since *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 14 the operation of the law of contempt is subject to the

overriding operation of the implied constitutional freedom of political communication.

24. Since the law burdens the freedom of such communication, the question is whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving its object, being the protection of the system of administration of justice."

12 *Mundey* (supra) at 908A; *Nicholls* at 286; *R v Dunbabin*
(1935) 53 CLR 434 at

13 *Mundey* (supra) at 908B.

14 (1997) 189 CLR 520.

is *ibid* at 561-2.

25. Care must be taken in defining the end to which the law is directed. The object of protecting administration of justice means to protect it against actual damage, in the sense of -

- (a) inhibiting the ability of a judge to decide a case fairly and without external pressure;
- (b) producing the level of obedience to orders of the Court.

26. The conduct in question creates no risk of any such damage. Accordingly, an application of the common law of contempt in relation to that conduct is not "appropriate and adapted" to the legitimate end which the law exists to serve.

Dated: 23 October 2001

**C M
Maxwell**

D A Perkins

P D Nicholas

J Manetta